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TO THE FORMATION OF THE NEW SYNDICATE                 123
Government proposes'; the whole intent of the legislation was in fact 'nothing but confiscation'.3
VI
In 1913 the question of a diamond-cutting industry had been
examined by a select committee of the Union Senate. It collected
some valuable evidence and produced a somewhat jejune majority
report in favour of the establishment of a cutting industry in South
Africa. As a means to tins end, the committee proposed the imposition
of a 10 per cent export duty on all uncut diamonds and, further,
suggested that 'Government, through the lever of its large interest in
some mines, should make a determined effort to secure the co-operation
of the producing companies in the establishment of a sufficient local
market in rough diamonds so that those wishing to establish local
factories may be sure of facilities for obtaining stones'. In 1917, by
Act No. 27, an export duty of 5 per cent was imposed on the value of
all rough and uncut diamonds exported from the Union, though
alluvial diamonds 'found by any person other than a corporate
body'
3 'What if the ill-advised producer', the speaker continued, 'refuses to sell his diamonds on the terms approved by the board, because he believes, no, he actually knows, he can do better by selling to someone else? Provision is made for the obstreperous pro­ducer, since the Governor General, being thwarted in his endeavour to buy the diamonds on his terms, will get even with the misguided producer by acting under section 16, and declare by proclamation that "it shall be unlawful for any producer indicated to sell or dispose of or export diamonds save to the board or through the agency of the board". That finishes the argument, and the producer must come to heel and accept the terms of the Governor General. After all, he gets some money for his diamonds by accepting the offer to purchase. The person who drafted this portion of the bill must know something about workmen and strikes, because it suddenly struck him that this foolish producer might go on strike and say: "It is true, I cannot sell to anyone else, but I am not going to sell to you either. I will rather keep my diamonds and accumulate them." Section 6(2b) deals with him. The board will, under those circumstances, take the diamonds without paying for them. It will "demand and receive the diamonds" under threat of forfeiture. That section must have been inspired by the Hon. Member for Troyeville. I suppose one of his Moscow friends must have described to him how they in Russia deal with diamonds. Does the hon. Minister really think that anyone would produce diamonds if they could be taken away from him without payment, or does he rely on the law, which enables him, under these circumstances, to take over a diamond mine or lease it to someone else if it is not worked to his satisfaction or closed down? The provisions establishing the control board are made pure confiscation through clauses 16 and 6(2)(6). The Minister explains the intention of this clause [6(2)(i)] by saying it might be required to deal with the producer who might not be willing to accept an offer from a particular purchaser, however good that offer may be, and that this power to demand the diamonds might be required under these circumstances. But he does not require the power, because he has the power of vetoing a contract of which he does not approve.'