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Ch. 4: Part II: Chairmanship de Beers

Ch. 4: Part II: Chairmanship de Beers Page of 688 Ch. 4: Part II: Chairmanship de Beers Text size:minus plus Restore normal size   Mail page  Print this page
166
SIR ERNEST OPPENHEIMER
Ernest Oppenheimer's warnings, refrained from including alluvial production within the scope of the Diamond Control Act of 1925. A draft bill had been proposed in 1926, but was not proceeded with, although it had been read for the first time on 28 April 1926. It must be pointed out, in fairness, that control over alluvial production did raise social and political problems of considerable delicacy. Both the Lich ten-burg and the Namaqualand discoveries (but the former to a much greater extent than the latter) had enormously increased the population of'diggers', many with no experience and few capable of resistance to adverse economic conditions. The nature of their occupation was such as to force them into a nomadic way of life, with a direct interest in seeing to it that new 'fields' should be proclaimed as often as possible and that nothing should be done to impede alluvial diggings as such. Their economic position also was such as to make them 'weak' sellers— whatever the state of the market, their interest was to sell, and to sell as soon as possible. Nevertheless, the problem of control was not simply one concerning the digging community; the land-owning community was also vitally interested. By subdivision of existing farms, the proprietors thereof under the then existing legislation could greatly increase the number of 'claims' to which they themselves were entitled as of right, and this subdivision, in turn, not only proportion­ately improved their pecuniary position but encouraged the formation of companies and of syndicates. Certain great land-owning corporations —especially the African and European Investment Company and the Transvaal Consolidated Land and Exploration Company—owning properties suspected of being diamond bearing or actually proved to be diamondiferous, were also vitally interested in the development of the Lichtenburg fields; similarly, the farmers of Namaqualand could also expect a rich harvest from sales of options or of farms. Any limitation of alluvial production by legal measures was thus, politically, a hazardous step.
The big producers were directly affected by the nature of the new discoveries; the Premier Mine by the fact that the Lichtenburg fields were directly competitive and the Kimberley mines by the fact that the Namaqualand stones were of such fine quality.2 From the standpoint of the Consolidated Diamond Mines of South West Africa, however, there was of course the exciting possibility, later to be verified, that the discoveries south of the Orange River might prove to be a prelude
2 A highly instructive analysis of comparative parcels from Alexander Bay and some other producers will be found in the paper by Wagner and Merensky already referred to, p. 20.
Ch. 4: Part II: Chairmanship de Beers Page of 688 Ch. 4: Part II: Chairmanship de Beers
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