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Ch. 4: Part II: Chairmanship de Beers

Ch. 4: Part II: Chairmanship de Beers Page of 688 Ch. 4: Part II: Chairmanship de Beers Text size:minus plus Restore normal size   Mail page  Print this page
200
SIR ERNEST OPPENHEIMER
bought normally by cutters from the South African Government, was worth about 305. per carat, 'which is approximately equivalent to the cost per carat of the wages paid in polishing goods of this size and quality'.
He continued:
If the South African cutter obtained the full benefit of the remaining 15 per cent, over and above the ordinary trade profit made by the European cutter on the sale of brilliants, the circumstances would theoretically be desirable, as that would constitute an additional incentive to the rapid expansion of the industry, but such is not the case. As a matter of fact, owing to his restricted financial resources the South African cutter cannot take full advantage of his favourable circumstances, and he is therefore exploited by the cutting establishments of Amsterdam and Antwerp, who finance him on condition that he sells them his brilliants. In existing cir­cumstances, when the South African industry is small, the European cutting establishments which finance South African cutters utilize the brilliants obtained to cheapen their other goods, and are thereby enabled to undersell other merchants who have not the advantage of tied South African sources of supply. If the business of the exploiting European cutters expands, the Syndicate will have to reduce their present prices in order to enable the other cutters to compete, and this reduction would inevitably connote a reduced price to the primary producers, that price being based on the prices realized in Europe. The South African cutter would then automatically obtain his rough goods at a reduced price and a vicious circle would be estab­lished in which the primary producers would be the sufferers. The foregoing illustrates the point I endeavoured to make in my letter of the 5th instant, i.e. that in the long run prices and assortments in South Africa must corre­spond with those of London, and the South African cutter should, therefore, only have the advantage of the export tax.
I may say that I have recently received cables from Europe, of which I enclose copies, referring to the exploitation of South African cutters by European cutters. Although I have been able to reassure my correspondents, the evil, of which they complain, is undoubtedly real and will increase as the possibilities of the present situation become more generally appreciated. That is why I have stated in this letter and in previous letters that the special concessions which the Syndicate is prepared to make to South Africa could only be allowed to foster the trade during its infancy. . . .
In spite of the cogency of these arguments, the Government adhered to its policy of separate sales and made special provision for continuing to do so in the sales agreement concluded with the Syndicate in February 1929.
Ch. 4: Part II: Chairmanship de Beers Page of 688 Ch. 4: Part II: Chairmanship de Beers
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