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Ch. 4: Part II: Chairmanship de Beers

Ch. 4: Part II: Chairmanship de Beers Page of 688 Ch. 5: Part III: Worst Crisis in Diamond Industry Text size:minus plus Restore normal size   Mail page  Print this page
218
SIR ERNEST OPPENHEIMER
cerned, and which, therefore, constituted the greatest danger to the diamond trade.
We kept also in the closest touch with developments in Namaqualand and acquired some interests there, both in Mr. Ronaldson's concern and in the very rich discovery at Alexander Bay. All information at our disposal has, as in the case of Lichtenburg, been made available to the De Beers company.
The diamond trade is passing through a very serious crisis which differs from all past depressions in the trade in that the cause is not a depression in 'world trade' but an over-production of diamonds. In my opinion the problem facing the trade can only be solved by a single institution tackling the various problems instead of several as at present. De Beers is to my mind the one institution that should take the lead. I suggested, therefore, to Mr. Joel that the time had come when we should come to an arrangement with De Beers company, under which De Beers would take over our various diamond interests, and take the lead in all diamond matters in future, our organizations giving every possible assistance. In pursuance of this policy, I suggested to Mr. Joel that De Beers should acquire his Jagersfontein holding, our holding in the Consolidated Diamond Mines of South West Africa Limited, and our joint Lichtenburg and Port Nolloth interests. All these concerns would then become subsidiaries of De Beers and the control of all important productions in the Union and South West would pass to De Beers. Mr. Joel has cabled to me to submit my ideas to the board which I hereby do. In the same cable he also told me that our colleagues in London do not approve of the acquisition of the Jagersfontein and South West Africa interests but are in favour of acquiring the Lichtenburg and Port Nolloth interests. I am fully convinced that this partial deal will not help to restore that absolute confidence in diamonds which is so essential if the trade is to be put on a sound basis, while I believe that the bigger deal will result in an immediate improvement.
It would be absurd to think that De Beers would take over our Lichtenburg and Port Nolloth interests unless it were clearly understood that in future all new diamond mining interests—whether they be alluvial leases or participa­tion in new discoveries—would be offered by us to De Beers or acquired by us (if asked to) on their behalf. Clearly the Anglo American Corporation would by such an arrangement he put into a subordinate position to De Beers as far as diamonds are concerned, and I submit that I cannot reasonably ask the Anglo American board or our shareholders to make that sacrifice unless all our diamond interests are taken over hy De Beers, preferably for De Beers shares.
If my colleagues want to discuss the position further please let me know.
In fairness to me, however, before any discussions take place, some explanation should be vouchsafed to me for the extraordinary exchange of cables between Kimberley and the London transfer office throwing doubt on my loyalty to De Beers, which were embodied in your letter to me.
Ch. 4: Part II: Chairmanship de Beers Page of 688 Ch. 5: Part III: Worst Crisis in Diamond Industry
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