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Ch. 5: Part III: Worst Crisis in Diamond Industry

Ch. 5: Part III: Worst Crisis in Diamond Industry Page of 688 Ch. 5: Part III: Worst Crisis in Diamond Industry Text size:minus plus Restore normal size   Mail page  Print this page
WORLD CRISIS AND WORLD LEADERSHIP
221
prolonged fall of prices and the massive unemployment which accom­panied that fall affected every part of the world, destroyed the inter­national gold standard and enormously strengthened the impulse towards narrow and selfish trade and economic policies and in the end threatened the entire social and political basis of the western world.
The onset of the depression already found the diamond industry facing the handicap of large stocks, the financing of which inevitably became more arduous the longer the depression lasted, since current production also involved a tie-up of funds. Inevitably, further, the prolongation of the depression made it impossible to arrive at finality in any dispositions made, and greatly increased the risk that the views of the Government and the views of the leaders of the industry should fail to coincide.
Inevitably, also, the depression imposed an almost intolerable burden upon Ernest Oppenheimer himself. His interests were not confined to the diamond industry and the universality of the collapse rendered the position of the base metal producers, and therefore of all his Rhodesian concerns, as precarious as that of the diamond producers. He had not only to confront technical problems of the most serious kind and to act as spokesman of the diamond industry in Parhament, but had also to confront the problem of finance in his own person. He was a rich man, but his fortune was bound up with the future of the diamond industry and trade, with Anglo American Corporation (also intimately linked with the diamond industry and trade) and with Rhodesian companies. In after life he would often refer to these years and admit that the strain was almost intolerable, not only from the physical and mental but also from the financial point of view. But he never lost either his courage or his resourcefulness.
In one other and important respect the situation was changing: the old generation was giving way to a new. S. B. Joel suffered a serious illness in 1930, and the possibility that he might not recover had already raised the question of whether the diamond industry could stand the shock of a possible withdrawal of 'Barnato money' from the trade and the further question of how to prevent the Jagersfontein Mine from passing into possibly hostile hands. He attended the 42nd annual meeting of De Beers, over which Ernest Oppenheimer presided for the first time, but he died on 22 May 1931. L. Breitmeyer, who together with F. Hirschhorn represented the last links with the old firm of Wernher, Beit and Company, had died in March of 1930; Sir David Harris, another veteran, retired from the De Beers board on 30 Sep-
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