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Ch. 5: Part III: Worst Crisis in Diamond Industry

Ch. 5: Part III: Worst Crisis in Diamond Industry Page of 688 Ch. 5: Part III: Worst Crisis in Diamond Industry Text size:minus plus Restore normal size   Mail page  Print this page
234
SIR ERNEST OPPENHEIMER
resisted by his colleagues and not eventually insisted upon by the Government.
There remained, when all other points had been settled, three main difficulties. The Government, as the owner of the Namaqualand State diggings, was naturally anxious to sell its diamonds, if not to the South African cutters, then to the Syndicate or the Diamond Corpora­tion. This aspect of the problem became inextricably mixed up with an allied matter—the right of the other producers to curtail operations, if, in spite of such curtailment, they could continue to contribute their full quota out of stocks. The Government took the view that the quota should be reduced if operations were reduced, because, as the Secretary for Mines argued in a letter to De Beers in August 1930, 'as the Govern­ment has to bear the brunt of the consequent unemployment and dis­tress it is not unreasonable to provide that the balance of such pro­ducers' quota should fall [sic] to be made up by the Government'.
The second main difficulty concerned the 'outside' producers in the true sense, namely, producers outside the Union and South West Africa, in particular the Angola and the Congo producing companies. The cultivation of good relations with these producers, and with the West African producers, had been for years one of Ernest Oppen-heimer's main preoccupations. In May 1930 he visited Brussels, in company with his brothers Louis and Otto (who had a special interest in Congo diamonds), G. Imroth (representing Barnato Brothers) and Sir Edmund Davis, a director of the Angola company. The result of this visit was that the contracts with B.C.K. and Forminiere were renewed until the end of 1934, subject to certain technical adjustments, while the Angola contract was also renewed. These arrangements were confirmed at a meeting in Paris in September, when the Angola company agreed, in principle, on Ernest Oppenheimcr's request to accept certain fixed minima for the period 1932-4.
There was, of course, a fundamental difference between the position of these companies and that of the South African companies: any arrangements concluded between them and the Syndicate were purely voluntary on their part, and no pressure could be brought to bear upon them by the South African Government, either to limit output, or indeed to sell to the Syndicate at all—so far as the Congo and Angola companies were concerned, they could always, if they wished, maintain a completely independent organization in Antwerp, one of the two great cutting centres. In the autumn of 1930 the agreements with these various companies had been shown confidentially to the Minister
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