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Ch. 5: Part III: Worst Crisis in Diamond Industry

Ch. 5: Part III: Worst Crisis in Diamond Industry Page of 688 Ch. 5: Part III: Worst Crisis in Diamond Industry Text size:minus plus Restore normal size   Mail page  Print this page
WORLD CRISIS AND WORLD LEADERSHIP                      25I
restored to more normal proportions Kimberley diamonds would sell themselves. As things were the Diamond Corporation was not in a position to dispute: 'if a customer comes along and says that he parti­cularly wants B.C.K. diamonds, it is no use saying to him, "I will not sell you this, you must buy conference producers' goods". The very stagnation in the trade and our financial needs make it impossible to argue: we must sell what a man wants.' In regard to the position of the Diamond Corporation, he said, 'I camiot agree to take on any obliga­tion which would throw £1 more responsibility on the Diamond Corporation, because our position is that we cannot afford one penny more. We do not know where to turn, and I will not, and cannot, accept any obligation which will increase our liability by one penny.' In reply to this passionate plea, the Minister stated:
I will not say anything now but in a fortnight's time I will tell you whether you have the Government's permission or not, as from 1 July 1931, in connexion with the reduction of your operations. This is not a small matter you have put before mc, and you must realize that when I have to give the Government's permission on a question of this magnitude, it is my bonnden duty first to consult all my colleagues.11
The last word rested with Ernest Oppenheimcr:
Wc will not publish it to the world. The main thing is that we have come to sec you on the matter and there can be no question of our having done anything without having first approached the Government. I am anxious that the most cordial relations should exist between the Government and ourselves. I can only repeat to you that we are really doing what we genuinely think is best in the interests of the trade.
The conference reassembled at Pretoria on 15 July 1931; meanwhile Mr. Dickinson, the consulting engineer of De Beers, and Dr. Pirow had been in touch with each other; naturally, Ernest Oppenheimer had been in touch with his friends and colleagues in London. He opened the discussions. He acknowledged the anxiety' of the Govern­ment over the 'ratio'; he thought London was doing its best; what really worried the producers was the level of prices now reached, which indicated disaster. Even the January-June prices of 1931 imperilled Jagersfoutein and the Consolidated Diamond Mines of South West
II To which Dr. Pirow, the Government expert, added: 'It should be made quite clear that the Government is considering whether it will give its permission or not, so that it is not to be understood that the Government has refused permission nor has it consented. Your operations will be reduced with the full knowledge of the Government. It is merely a matter of suspending the Government's reply for fourteen days. I would rather you did not use the Government's name in any announcement to the public.'
Ch. 5: Part III: Worst Crisis in Diamond Industry Page of 688 Ch. 5: Part III: Worst Crisis in Diamond Industry
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