Ch. 5: Part III: Worst Crisis in Diamond Industry

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WORLD CRISIS AND WORLD LEADERSHIP                  259
the end of December; and on 6 January the Minister was presented with an elaborate memorandum setting out the offer in detail. The basic fact to be faced was that the South African receipts did not amount to £600,000 South African, or, as the memorandum was to put it, did not reach £600,000 gold. That being so, modification in the pro­gramme was inevitable. The preamble to the memorandum set out the position:
According to the undertaking given to the Government last July, the producers undertook to continue the scale of working adopted for the second six months of 1931 and for the first semester of 1932, provided the replacement for this latter period was £600,000, based on five-eighths of the total sales by the Diamond Corporation of conference producers' and outside goods, and calculated in accordance with the sales agreements.
It is clearly evident now that the replacement figure will not equal .£600,000 in gold, and therefore the producers are free from the obligation of the undertaking referred to.
However, 'with the object of averting drastic retrenchment of white labour at the various properties and the resulting distress of such a step in the present critical times', a modified programme was suggested. As regards the Premier and the Consolidated Diamond Mines, produc­tion was to be carried on till 30 June 1932 at the then current rate, subject to certain minor modifications—the same applied to Koffiefon-tein though this mine was not a conference producer. As regards New Jagersfontein, which was in a serious financial condition, its expenditure was to be limited 'to the sum necessary to maintain and protect the property'.
The critical case was, obviously, the position of De Beers itself. The producers offered to carry on operations on the then current scale till 31 March 1932. If at that date sales had reached .£300,000 in gold, 'plus one-half of the difference between £600,000 and the actual replacement in gold', the same scale of production would be continued till 30 June 1932. This, in effect, meant that the minimum receipts in South African currency required to make the offer effective was £450,000. If sales subsequently increased, so as to make receipts £1,000,000 gold (or .£1,000,000 S.A.), production would be main­tained on the same scale till December 1932; and the mines would revert to the production programme of the first three months 1931,
Kotze, important new directors of De Beers, by E. H. Farrer and J. H. Gratton, managing director and executive secretary respectively of the Diamond Corporation, and by H. T. Dickinson, the consulting engineer to De Beers.
Ch. 5: Part III: Worst Crisis in Diamond Industry Page of 688 Ch. 5: Part III: Worst Crisis in Diamond Industry
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