if
receipts were £3,000,000 gold or S.A. currency. In the hght of the then
situation, it was perhaps superfluous to look so far ahead as this,
though the Government was later to insist upon a discussion of this
point.
From
the beginning, the conference did not go well. The Minister was
'disappointed. ... I was hoping that you were going to tell me that it
was time you came back to the agreement that was suspended. It appears,
however, that you are forgetting all about that agreement; it does not
seem to interest you.' He said that he meant that remark seriously and
upset Ernest Oppenheimer very much; '. . . I am surprised. Here we
spend millions to keep the trade going and prevent unemployment—we must
have spent -£2,000,000—and I don't think it is fair for you to talk
like that. People like [certain small mines] close down without asking
you, and we who are keeping people employed are told we are forgetting
the contract.' The Minister certainly did not improve relations when he
said, after complaining that hitherto there 'was never any mention
about £600,000 in gold', that 'it seems to me that you were
looking for an opportunity to be freed from your obligation!' [51c].
Ernest Oppenheimer's retort was fierce:
If
we were looking for an opportunity would we put forward a proposal to
dispense with the services of a few redundant men and keep everybody
else employed? However, we are not going to quarrel here about
£600,000. We have told you that it is our endeavour to help the
Government and keep our people employed. We were prepared to spend
£600,000 and if we got that money in we would keep our people employed;
it had to be South African money. We have not got that money in and our
financial position has got worse and worse. Regarding the Premier Mine,
which is an open-cast mine, if you wanted that mine to fill, it would
not do any great damage; Koffyfontein could also be allowed to fill,
but in the case of De Beers and Jagersfontein, if we allowed these
mines to fill we would be endangering a national asset. It is only fair
that De Beers must keep reserves in hand to meet the crisis over a long
period. I have been attacked by shareholders for the policy I have
pursued. De Beers company cannot afford to have less money in hand. If
we do not sell for two years we must keep our mines pumped. I do not
know how long the crisis will last. We have reduced our resources to
the lowest possible figure. We cannot pay a preference dividend. All
along we have done everything we possibly can and then we are told that
we are trying to get out of our obligation.
For
a while matters improved, as Sir Frank Meyer gave a long expose of the
financial position of the various companies, and of the dangers
