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Ch. 5: Part III: Worst Crisis in Diamond Industry

Ch. 5: Part III: Worst Crisis in Diamond Industry Page of 688 Ch. 5: Part III: Worst Crisis in Diamond Industry Text size:minus plus Restore normal size   Mail page  Print this page
WORLD CRISIS AND WORLD LEADERSHIP
273
ing of negotiations, he then traversed the whole of the subsequent negotiations. Much of the ground that he covered has already been recorded in the preceding pages, but it is important to emphasize several points in his speech. First, he insisted on the fact that the pro­ducers were within their rights to close down, once the receipts from sales did not cover the operating costs in South Africa: this followed from the correspondence of the previous August. 'If the Minister still thinks we did not enter into a binding agreement, he has an easy remedy. Under the original contract the Minister can penalize the De Beers company for closing down. Let him impose the penalties, and we are quite ready to go to law and the court will decide.' He returned to the point again when he was dealing with the charge that the Minister was not 'officially informed' of the intention of the pro­ducers to close down—a point which arose in connexion with the interview with the Press and not with the statement to the Assembly:
. . . What the Minister says is extremely misleading. He says that he was not officially informed of the position. Let us take this 'officially informed'. As I have explained to you, we were within our legal rights, and are now, in closing down. We did not do it willingly. I have never performed a harder task than to close down De Beers mines. It was my ambition to keep going, and the Minister has frustrated my endeavours. The Minister's statement is incomprehensible. What better official information can any Minister get than to have the chairman of the company, accompanied by two other directors, calling on him and saying 'here is our position. We intimate to you that we have to close down.' Does the Minister prefer a letter from the office boy, or what? Surely when I, as chairman, accompanied by Sir Robert Kotze and another colleague, take full responsibility, and tell him what our position is, he cannot say afterwards, 'I have had no official information at all'. The Minister is quite right in one thing. When the Minister says that we did not ask for his permission to close down, he is quite correct. We did not ask his permission. There is no reason to ask the Minister's permission. We were within our rights in closing down. We could have closed down without saying anything to the Minister at all. The Minister knew the position. In terms of the agreement of July last, his consent was not needed nor was it requested. But we felt it was our duty to keep the Minister fully posted, and even to fall in with his wishes as far as possible. We explained the position fully to the Minister; we told him that the financial position of the producers and the bad outlook in the diamond market made it desirable for the producers to close down at the end of February. The Minister asked if we could not make it 31 March, or some­thing to that effect, and therefore in order to show that not only did we feel it our duty to keep the Minister fully posted, but because we wanted to
Ch. 5: Part III: Worst Crisis in Diamond Industry Page of 688 Ch. 5: Part III: Worst Crisis in Diamond Industry
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