370
SIR ERNEST OPPENHEIMER
territory,
to conclude sales agreements with local companies or producers, and/or
to acquire ownership rights in diamond enterprises in whole or in part.
Lastly, it was possible to grant to such outside companies interests in
the sales organization. But these latter arrangements were, naturally,
only possible if the outside producing agency was a clearly defined
legal entity with whom formal and binding legal engagements could be
drawn up.
It
was one of the difficulties of the post-war situation that the
application of these procedures was only partially possible. In the
case of West Africa, the situation was complicated by the emergence of
the same problem that had threatened the stability of the diamond trade
at the time of the Lichtenburg and Namaqualand discoveries two decades
earlier—namely, the rise of a 'digging community', through the grant of
licences to the local diggers on the Gold Coast (subsequently the State
of Ghana), and also in the Colony of Sierra Leone. In the former area
the Consolidated African Trust, the main operating company, never
possessed exclusive mining rights; in Sierra Leone, the Sierra Leone
Selection Trust, a wholly owned subsidiary of C.A.S.T., did at one time
possess such rights for a period of ninety-nine years. Nevertheless, in
consequence of encroachment by 'illicit' Native diggers, it was found
necessary in 1955 not only to reduce the length of life of the
concession given to the Sierra Leone Selection Trust, but also to
reduce the limits of their concession. Subsequential legislation was
also necessary to provide an adequate procedure for the issue of
diggers' licences. Moreover, apart altogether from possible errors in
the administration of the mining code, Sierra Leone became, or it is
perhaps better to say, remained, a vast centre of illicit diamond
production, and consequentially, of illicit diamond dealing and
smuggling. It was by no means only the specific interests of the Sierra
Leone Selection Trust which were hazarded: the revenue interests, and,
consequentially, the whole economic and political future of Sierra
Leone were at stake. The situation, even after the passage of the
legislation permitting 'Native' digging, remained very serious. At the
end of 1956, it was found necessary to expel 32,000 foreign Natives
from the territory;42 but even this drastic measure did not
solve the problem. As late as the beginning of 1959, an authoritative
journal was describing the situation in Sierra Leone as having
reached
such proportions as to imperil the whole economic and constitutional
future of the country. ... It was hoped that by throwing open large 42 The Times, London, 20 January 1958.
