442 SIR ERNEST OPPENHEIMER
October
1936. On this basis the company's production from that date until 31
December is at the rate of 2,830 long tons of fine copper per month.
Under the restriction agreement, special provisions were made to meet
the position of this company, which accepted a lower quota at the
outset, owing to its relatively early stage of development. The
agreement accordingly provides for automatic increases in the Mufulira
company's quota as from 1 January and 1 October 1937. If no further
alteration in quotas takes place, the company's output from 1 January
1937 will be 3,520 long tons, and from 1 October 1937, 4,209 long tons
per month. . . .
The
result was that the Selection group output rose considerably faster
than the output of the Rhoanglo (Rhokana) group: the output of the
former stood at 140,000 long tons at the end of 1939, while the
Rlioanglo output was only 92,000 tons. It is true that the minority
interest of Rlioanglo in Mufulira was large and, 'profit-wise', it
stood to gain as the operations of that mine expanded; nevertheless,
there was a loss of prestige and of bargaining power associated with
the Ac facto position of which Ernest Oppenlieimer was very
conscious and which he resented. The practical issue was whether the
N'Chang a. Mine should remain a 'dead' property or whether it should be
developed—which required new finance.
Leslie
Pollak's premature death had robbed Ernest Oppenlieimer of the presence
in Johannesburg of his principal local adviser in Rhodesian affairs,
but he set out his views at great length and with great frankness in a
letter which he wrote to S. S. Taylor, the London managing director of
Rhokana, on 5 August 1938. He argued that the widely advertised and
poor view that their American advisers had taken of the N'Changa Mine
had led to the properties of the Selection Trust being regarded as the
more promising prospects and had led to a loss of bargaining power:
'Rhokana lost its preferential position and the Roan was put on
equality. Mufulira was recognized as a second producer, while N'Changa
was treated as a joke.' The facts proved that the gloomy views
entertained as to N'Changa were erroneous: 'the position is, therefore,
that a deep-rooted view has had to be eliminated, easily enough from
our own minds, but with the greatest difficulty from the minds of our
competitors.'
He was hi a fighting mood:
My
feeling is this. If it is necessary to preserve our position in the
Northern Rhodesian copper world, I would open N'Changa and be not
influenced by threats. ... It is true that other people can produce
copper somewhat cheaper, but they certainly would not want to sell it
at a price which would show a
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